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This paper tests whether the transition from the old Economic Competition Act, which was 
based on the so-called “abuse system”, to the new Competition Act, which was based on 
“prohibition system”, in the Netherlands had an impact on the price-cost margins in 
manufacturing industries during the period 1993-2007. The paper further investigates if the 
price-cost margins were higher in industries where temporary antitrust immunity was granted 
for subset of firms that engaged in concerted practices. The results indicate that the change in 
the competition law in the Netherlands had a very small and negative, yet statistically 
insignificant deterrent effect on the price-cost margins. Elsewhere, markups were higher in 
industries in which temporary antitrust immunity was granted for some class of coordinated 
actions. 
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1.  Introduction 
There is increasing curiosity among competition authorities with regard to the economic 
effects of competition policy and the effectiveness of enforcing the competition law. 
Policymakers are keen on quantifying the impact of antitrust policies. A great majority of 
competition authorities focus on the effects of competition policy on consumer surplus, since 
protecting consumers and maximizing consumer surplus is reckoned as a mission statement 
by many competition authorities. Yet, there is another dimension of competition policy 
enforcement, which is on producer surplus. Increased competition decreases monopoly power 
and reduces price-cost margins (controlling for other relevant factors).  
 
This curiosity among policymakers is even more intense in the Netherlands, since there have 
been dramatic changes during the last twenty years. The old Economic Competition Act of 
1956 (WEM: Wet Economische Mededinging), which was based on the so-called “abuse 
system”, was replaced by the new Competition Act (Mededingingswet), which was based on 
“prohibition system”.  Concurrently, the new enforcement agency, the Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa) was established in 1998. Furthermore, the new Competition 
Act allowed undertakings to apply for dispensation for agreements that were already in 
existence and that had begun under the former Act. More specifically, firms were allowed to 
request exemption for agreements, decisions or conduct that improved production/distribution 
or stimulated economic or technical progress, and, if a reasonable portion of the benefits 
accrued to consumers. Furthermore, there have been several amendments in the Competition 
Act since then. The Competition Act was first amended in accordance with the European 
Competition Law in 2004 as a result of European Regulation 1/2003. Another amendment 
took place on July 1st, 2005, when the NMa was given the status of Autonomous 
Administrative Authority. Finally, as of October 1st, 2007, the NMa has been awarded 
additional powers, as a result of the evaluation of the Competition Act.  
 
In this study we investigate the impact of the change in the competition policy enforcement in 
the Netherlands and the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity mentioned above on 
the level of industry price-cost margins for manufacturing industries. We hypothesize that a 
tougher competition policy reduces the ability of firms in any market to collude and, 
consequently, the price-cost margins will be lower, whilst controlling for other factors that are 
believed to affect the price-cost margins. We also hypothesize that in industries where 3 
 
concerted practices are immune from antitrust law, the price-cost margins will be higher, 
everything else being equal. In order to test these hypotheses, we employ a two-step dynamic 
panel data estimation technique developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). Our estimation results 
suggest that the change in the competition law in the Netherlands had a very small and 
negative, yet statistically insignificant deterrent effect on the price-cost margins. As to the 
impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity in the aftermath of the institutional change, 
we found that markups were higher in industries in which temporary antitrust immunity was 
granted for some class of coordinated actions. 
 
The plan of the study is as follows: Section 2 presents a review of prior empirical research on 
deterrent effects of antitrust policy enforcement and on economic impact of granting antitrust 
immunity. Section 3 explains the institutional background for competition policy in the 
Netherlands. Section 4 provides the details of data employed in this study and elaborates on 
the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Finally Section 6 discusses 
the empirical findings and concludes. 
 
2.  Review of the Relevant Literature 
2.1  Deterrent Effects of Antitrust Policy Enforcement 
The empirical studies examining the deterrent effects of antitrust policy enforcement can be 
grouped into two categories: studies at micro-level in which data arises from prosecution and 
studies at macro-level in which a broader section of overall economic activity is analyzed.  
Beginning from micro-level studies, in their analysis of the market for white pan bread, Block 
et al. (1981) reveal that raising Department of Justice’s (DOJ) enforcement capacity or 
indicting a DOJ price-fixing complaint had the deterrent effect of decreasing markups in the 
industry. Block and Feinstein (1986) collect data on about 1000 highway contracts in the U.S. 
over the period from January 1975 to May 1982. Their findings of the empirical analysis 
suggest that increases in the level of sanctions for bid rigging had a deterrent effect in the U.S. 
highway construction industry. Elsewhere, Sproul (1993) used data from a survey of 25 price-
fixing cases filed by the DOJ to firms operating in various industries between 1973 and 1984. 
Surprisingly, a filing for price fixing results in slightly higher prices. More specifically, prices 
increase by approximately 7 percent over the four years after indictment. The author ascribes 
this result to either that DOJ prosecuted cost-reducing cartels or the penalties were not 4 
 
deterrent enough. Besides, he also found out that the severity of penalties was negatively 
associated with price. 
 
On the other hand, studies at macro-level focused on impact of change in antitrust policy on 
markups in a broader section of overall economic activity.  These changes in antitrust policy 
have mostly been in the form of tightening competition law or following a stricter antitrust 
policy. An example is Konings et al. (2001), where the authors investigate if the changes in 
the competition law and policy have an impact on the level and the dynamics of firm price 
cost margins in Belgium. Using a firm level panel dataset from 1992 to 1996, they reveal that 
competition policy in Belgium did not have an impact on price-cost margins. The authors 
attribute this finding to that the old price regulatory system had already disciplined Belgian 
firms considerably. Elsewhere, Warzynski (2001) tested whether price cost margins were 
lower when antitrust policy was implemented strictly relatively to the period when antitrust 
policy was lenient thanks to the influence of the Chicago School. In his analysis of the data 
for 450 American manufacturing industries from 1958 to 1994, he reveals that markups were 




Taking all these into account, we would conclude that the empirical evidence on the deterrent 
effects of antitrust policy enforcement is mixed. This is fundamentally owing to the 
idiosyncrasy of the institutions, antitrust policy design and data in each study mentioned 
above.  
  
2.2  Economic Impact of Granting Antitrust Immunity  
Firms have incessantly been searching for ways to bypass the constraints that are imposed by 
the antitrust laws that shape economic environment. One possible way of circumventing the 
competition laws is having  antitrust immunity via exemption applications. Antitrust 
authorities have been flooded with many antitrust immunity applications involving efficiency 
or ruinous competition arguments as long as the laws enabled them to grant exemptions. 
Competition authorities have either rejected those applications or conferred exemptions under 
specific conditions.   
 
                                                           
1 The sample was divided in two periods: 1958-1973 when antitrust authorities monitored market structure very 
closely, and 1973-1994 when the impact of Chicago School led to a shift in antitrust policy.  5 
 
Carlton and Picker (2007) discuss that an industry operating under the antitrust laws might 
demand  antitrust immunity from those laws for one of the two following reasons: The 
industry might want to refrain from inefficiencies brought about by antitrust laws. Or, the 
industry might want to evade the restrictions of the antitrust laws and want to engage in anti-
competitive practices such as cartelization in order to glean profits.  In other words, even 
though the utilization of immunities, as a mechanism to enhance effective competition policy, 
may be socially desirable in cases where coordinated action is necessary for efficiency, some 
forms of exemptions might result in collective dominance on the exempted industries to the 
detriment of society. Worse still, the immunity holders might find it profitable to engage in 
tacit collusion well after the immunity is lapsed. 
 
There have been a couple of empirical studies analyzing the impact of antitrust immunity in 
various industries. Most of these empirical studies center on airlines industries where antitrust 
immunity is granted for coordinating joint operations such as scheduling, pricing decisions, 
forming revenue-sharing joint ventures in international markets. To mention a few, Oum et al. 
(1996); Park and Zhang (2000); Brueckner and Whalen (2000); Brueckner (2003); Whalen 
(2007); and Bilotkach (2007) report that airline alliances with antitrust immunity offer lower 
fares. On the other hand, in his analysis of the effect of an agreement in which two airline 
companies were allowed to coordinate on capacity and sales targets, Kamita (2010) finds that 
the airline companies not only raised  fairs under antitrust immunity but also retained 
supracompetitive profits after the immunity expired. Bilotkach and Huschelrath (2011) 
discuss also that antitrust immunity might have some effects on non-price characteristics of 
airline markets  except for the effects on prices. They argue  that antitrust immunity can 
constrain individual partner airlines’ network development, facilitate collusion, and lead to the 
foreclosure of the interline markets to airlines from competing alliances. Elsewhere, in his 
analysis of Webb-Pomerene export cartels that were exempted from the antitrust laws, Dick 
(1992) reports that these cartels were successful in raising prices in only three commodity 
industries. Interestingly, Clyde and Reitzes (1995), in their study of the U.S. international 
ocean shipping industry that enjoyed antitrust immunity and a conference system that 
permitted carriers to enter into pricing agreements, could not find a significant relationship 
between conference share and freight rates. Overall, the general conclusion to be drawn from 
these empirical studies is that the effects of antitrust immunity on market prices are 
indeterminate, as pointed out in Bilotkach and Huschelrath (2011). 
 6 
 
3.  The Enforcement of Dutch Competition Policy during the Last 
Two Decades 
Netherlands’ competition policy has changed drastically over the past twenty years. The old 
Economic Competition Act of 1956 (WEM: Wet Economische Mededinging), which was 
based on the so-called “abuse system”, was superseded  by the new Competition Act 
(Mededingingswet), which was based on “prohibition system”. The new enforcement agency, 
the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa) was synchronously established in 1998. Since 
then, there have been several amendments in the Competition Act. As a result of European 
Regulation 1/2003, the Competition Act was first amended in accordance with the European 
Competition Law in 2004. Another amendment came on July 1st, 2005, when the NMa was 
awarded the status of Autonomous Administrative Authority. Finally, as of October 1st, 2007, 
the NMa has been given additional powers, as a result of the evaluation of the Competition 
Act. 
 
Under the former Economic Competition Act, the enforcer, which was the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MEA), had to make a plea  in each case that a practice  or agreement 
infringed the law. The MEA, as the enforcer, had the burden of proof, which is reversed under 
the new prohibition system, so that the firm should demonstrate that practices or agreements 
associated with the law’s prohibitions are compatible with the standard. Moreover, the old 
Economic Competition Act’s main touchstone was simply the “general interest”, a concept 
deficient in context or guidance for decisions. Firms with a restrictive agreement that was not 
against the “general interest” had to notify  the MEA, which accordingly  registered the 
agreement in the Dutch “Kartel Register”. What is more to the point, deciding whether 
agreements were against the general interest or not required deliberation with other ministries, 
which were primarily  worried  about other aspects of the general interest rather than 
competition policy. In a report by OECD (1998), it is stated that every case could turn out to 
be an opportunity for fundamental debate about the relative ascendancy of competition policy, 
and for many years competition policy undoubtedly lost. Consequently, those choices about 
aspects of general interest led to the lax enforcement of the old Economic Competition Act. 
 
On the whole, the lax enforcement of the previous competition law brought about tolerance 
towards collusive business behavior in the Netherlands, which, in turn, raised the fame of the 
Netherlands as “cartel paradise”. The government’s confidential cartel register contained 245 7 
 
agreements to divide markets, around 270 agreements to fix prices, together with around 50 
exclusive dealing agreements and more than 200 agreements to control competition in 
distribution (OECD, 1993, p. 60). The endurance of these anti-competitive agreements can be 
seen from details that the MEA (1989) released in 1989 on 109 horizontal price agreements 
that were active in September 1988. 40 per cent of these agreements had survived for more 
than twenty years and a further 20 per cent had already celebrated their tenth anniversary 
(Asbeek- Brusse and Griffiths, 1998, p. 24). As to the scale of these agreements, 77 % of 
them were at national level, while the remaining 23 % were operating locally. Dramatically, 
the majority of these agreements consisted of multiple provisions, as can be seen from Table 
I. 
 
In 1992, the MEA (1992) announced further details on the 201 market sharing agreements 
that were being kept in the register in September 1991. These agreements were relatively 
younger compared to the previously mentioned horizontal price agreements. Only 14 per cent 
had been in the register for more than two decades and another 17 per cent had been kept on 
the  records  for more than ten years (Asbeek-  Brusse and Griffiths, 1998, p. 25). More 
interestingly, even within the general description of “market sharing”, 94 % of these 
agreements involved other forms of restrictive practices.  
 
The renown of the Netherlands as cartel paradise had also been confirmed internationally, 
since 21 of the total 55 incidences of serious restrictions to competition of a predominantly 
national character that have been the subject of an Order under Article 85(1) EEC Treaty 
during 1970-1989 (almost 40 % of the cases) involved the Netherlands, as reported by de 
Jong (1990).  
 
Having argued that the Netherlands was indeed a cartel paradise under the former Economic 
Competition Act, we can discuss more detailed explanations for the failure of the prosecution 
of anti-competitive practices. Actually, most of the explanation lies within the nature of the 
legislation itself. To begin with, the old Economic Competition Act postulated that cartels are 
not harmful, unless the government showed the contrary, which left the burden of proof to the 
government. Second, the term “general interest”, a concept deficient in context or guidance 
for decisions, was not specified within the Act, which entrusted the MEA a large margin of 
judgment. Finally, despite the fact that there was a cartel register, the Act did not law down 
provisions for detecting  unregistered  restrictive agreements  or for sanctions against non-8 
 
registration.  Accordingly, the agreements recorded  under the register represented an 
incomplete depiction of cartels.  
 
In brief, the competition policy under the former Economic Competition Act was completely 
reactive.  Since  other aspects of the general interest contained  macro-economic policy 
objectives in the form of price controls, or its industrialization and regional policies, or 
industrial subsidies supporting sectors during the first oil crisis, antitrust policy could not find 
much space to itself. Moreover, as indicated by Asbeek- Brusse and Griffiths (1998), the 
conflicts were resolved within the deliberations between business representatives and 
governmental officials. More often than not, officials at the MEA worked concomitantly with 
business representatives. This intimacy brought about  a  gentle stance towards collusive 
business behavior.  
 
Having understood that the local legislative climate posed little threat to coordinated business 
behavior, one might ask the question of whether exposure to trade in the Dutch economy had 
a disciplining effect on concerted practices. However, the fact that three-fourths of Dutch 
consumers’ purchases were domestic proves this statement to be wrong. More specifically, 
industries such as construction, utilities, financial transactions, transport, retail trade, and 
consumer and professional services, which cover a great majority of the economic activities, 
were isolated from imports (OECD, 1998, p. 7).  
 
Given the lax enforcement of the domestic competition law, one might also consider the 
involvement of European Commission (EC) and the European Competition Law as a second 
potential threat to collusive business behavior in the Netherlands. Actually, the fact that the 
Dutch were among the last to have legislation that did not prohibit coordinated actions utterly 
meant that Dutch cartels were under close inspection by the EC to a greater extent. The initial 
effect of the EC competition law was on the behavior of firms instead of the enforcement of 
the domestic competition law. For example, while there were 125  recorded  collective 
exclusive dealing agreements in 1963, there were only 45 agreements registered in 1978 
(Mok, 1978, p. 743-744). Part of this decrease might be attributed to the closer inspection by 
the EC into Dutch cartels. This closer scrutiny had started in 1971, when the first EC decision 
stating that a cartel among Dutch firms (the Dutch Cement Dealers’ Association) had violated 9 
 
Article 81 TEC came
2,3, and it climaxed in 1977, when the EC prohibited the system of 
collective exclusive dealing among Dutch bicycle dealers4, even though it had been allowed 
after some adjustments under the former Economic Competition Act. Over and above, in 
1992, the EC decided that the Dutch construction cartel, which was a purely national cartel by 




This decision was later ratified by the European Court of First Instance. Even worse, the EC 
initiated a procedure against the Dutch government based on Article 226 TEC. Stated more 
precisely, it brought forward that the Dutch competition law and administrative practices, 
inter alia the industry’s agreements, hindered  the proper functioning of the European 
competition rules (Drahos, 2001, p. 213).   
The initial reaction of the Dutch government was to invigorate the anti-cartel policy within 
the existing framework. Except for a more active policy of dealing with cartel complaints, this 
included a sequence of general prohibitions on horizontal price agreements (effective from 
July 1993) and, on market sharing agreements and collusive tendering agreements (effective 
from June 1994). Yet, owing to the inapplicability of these early prohibitions due to the nature 
of the former “abuse system”; a new Competition Act (Mededingingswet), which was based 
on “prohibition system”, was introduced in 1998, accompanied by the establishment of the 
new enforcement agency (NMa).  
 
Article 6 of the new Competition Act complies with Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 81 TEC 
and ex Article 85 EEC Treaty) in its forbiddance of all types of anti-competitive agreements. 
As to exemptions, the Dutch competition law subsumes all of the EU block exemptions for 
general types of agreements, exemptions for specific sectors, and exemptions for specific 
agreements.
6 This incorporation is dynamic in the sense that the Dutch law incorporates not 




Elsewhere, the new Competition Act enabled  undertakings to apply for dispensation for 
agreements that were already in existence and that had begun in the pro-cartel period. More 
specifically, undertakings were allowed to request exemption from Article 6 Mw via Article 
                                                           
2 Decision of 16 December 1971, JO 1972  L13/34 
3 Case 8/72  
4 Centraal Bureau voor de Rijwielhandel, OJ 1978 L20/18 
5 Building and construction industry in the Netherlands, OJ 1992 L92/1 
6 The Competition Act, Articles 12-14 Mw. 
7 The Competition Act, Article 12 Mw. 10 
 
17 Mw (which has been repealed later) of the Competition Act. However, one should bear in 
mind that not every anti-competitive agreement would get antitrust-immunity. To be more 
precise, in Article 17 Mw it was stated: “The director general may grant an exemption from 
the prohibition of Article 6(1) Mw for agreements, decisions or concerted practices, within 
the meaning of that Article, which contribute to improving the production or distribution or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit, and which do not: (a) impose any restrictions on the undertakings 
concerned, ones that are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, or (b) afford 
such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of 
the products and services in question.”  Hence, Article 17 Mw specified that agreements 
would be exempted from Article 6 Mw if said agreements, decisions or conduct improved 
production/distribution or stimulated economic or technical progress, and, if a reasonable 
portion of the benefits accrued to consumers. In return for applying for an exemption, 
undertakings were compelled to provide data on several features of the planned cooperation: 
the number of firms involved, the duration of agreements, the total sales of all firms involved 
in cooperative agreement etc. The reaction was that the NMa was swarmed with dispensation 
requests – 1,100 at the deadline. The evaluation of these exemption requests by the NMa 
literally took years (until 2004). Based on assessments, the NMa (i) declined the request, as the 
agreement was not anti-competitive, or (ii) exemption was granted for some other requests, 
even though the agreements were anti-competitive by nature, or (iii) dispensation was granted 
after altering or reformulating the initial agreements by the firms involved, or (iv) reached the 
decision that the Competition Act is not applicable.  Referring to the NMa’s verdicts on 
dispensation applications, of these dispensation requests, 47 % did not violate any of the new 
competition rules, whereas of the other 53 %, only 9 % were granted as exemptions by the 
NMa.  
 
There were a couple of different motives of parties to seek dispensation. For some of them, 
the main motivation was legal certainty. Firms wanted to abstain from the ambiguity about 
competition issues, as  there had been substantial  changes in the competition law and its 
enforcement, which left most of the companies hesitant about their agreements with other 
undertakings. In spite of the fact that general prohibitions on horizontal price agreements and, 
on market sharing agreements and collusive tendering agreements became effective as of July 
1993, and of June 1994, respectively; there were not many prosecutions during the period 
between the early prohibitions and the change in the competition law (between 1993 and 11 
 
1998). On the other hand, the motivation for undertakings with anti-competitive agreements 
was different. At the time of the change in the law, there were some “cartels” with huge 
amounts of investments experiencing overcapacity problems. The members of those “cartels” 
wanted to divide overcapacity, and, in search of legal protection, they sought antitrust 




Herein might someone doubt that hardcore cartels were not contained in the subsample of the 
dispensations requests with anti-competitive agreements. “Dirty” cartels should not be 
expected to be on the original list in the first place, so to speak, since one cannot expect 
cartels to be reported in 1998, as they had already been declared illegal in 1994. This notion is 
partially  true, as there were very few price-fixing cases in these exemption  requests. 
Nonetheless, the remaining dispensation requests with anti-competitive agreements contain 
market sharing agreements, bid rigging agreements (which has always been a problem in the 
Netherlands, and not been seen as restrictive), joint production agencies (e.g. asphalt 
production) etc, which were  evident breaches of the competition law. Indeed, these were 
typical Dutch cartels operating at national or local level. Furthermore, one should note that 
even though there were general prohibitions under the former Economic Competition act, 
these provisions were laxly applicable and the enforcement was very weak in the sense that 
there were very few prosecutions during the period of 1993-1998.  
 
4.  The Data and Empirical Specifications 
4.1  Data Sources 
We use several two different sources of data. These are Dispensation Requests Database and 
Production Survey (PS). Below, we briefly describe these main sources of data. 
 
Dispensation Requests Database 
This database includes original dispensation requests from the NMa achieves. The database is 
confidential and is not publicly available to researchers. It contains the names of undertakings 




 codes), the number of parties in an agreement, the total annual revenues 
of the companies involved in an agreement, and the duration of agreement.  
                                                           
8 Interview with Prof. van Sinderen (the Chief Economist of the NMa) 
9 De Standaard Bedrijfsindeling 12 
 
In total, there are approximately  1,100 dispensation applications. The median number of 
parties in these applications is 50. Besides, the average duration of the agreements for which 
exemption was sought is 6.5 years with a standard deviation of 8.7 years. For the minority of 
the dispensation applications for which the competition law applied, immunity was granted. 
To be more specific, 37 concerted practices in various industries were exempted from the 
competition law. There is not a clear pattern for these industries with antitrust immunity. As 
to the duration  of the antitrust immunity, the average time period during which these 
multilateral restrictive practices were exempted from the competition law was 5.39 years. 
 
PS 
Production Survey (PS) is conducted by the Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS) on an annual 
basis. Data from PS is available for the period between 1993 and 2006.
10
 
 The PS is a sampled 
survey; only firms with more than 20 employees are contained in the sample each year. For 
smaller firms, sampling fractions decrease, and consequently smallest firms will have gaps in 
the data for several years.  
After aggregating firm level data to industry level data, we merged the two data sources at the 
3 (and sometimes 4) digit SIC-code. Having juxtaposed the datasets provided by the CBS and 
the NMa, we have obtained a sample of 112 industries for which data is running from 1993 to 
2007. 
 
4.2  Empirical Strategy and Variables 
In the current study, we try to measure if tougher competition policy enforcement had 
deterrent effects by regressing industry price-cost margins on a dummy indicating the change 
in the competition law in the Netherlands and a set of control variables. Concurrently, we also 
investigate if the price-cost margins have been higher in those industries where temporary 
antitrust agreement has been conferred for some class of concerted practices. The following 
specification is employed to test the impact of the change in the competition law in the 
Netherlands:  
 
𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝗾𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝗽1𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽2𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽4𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽5𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝗽6ℎℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽7𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑋ℎℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                                                           




Besides, we also estimate the following model to investigate the impact of granting temporary 
antitrust immunity on price-cost margins in industry after the change in the competition law: 
 
𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝗿𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃1𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡




 𝑖= industry 
  𝑡 = year.  
pcmit = industry price-cost margin 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
pcmit-1 = lagged industry price-cost margin  
Variable for the Impact of the Competition Act (Mededingingswet) 
lawit = 1 if industry operated under the Competition Act (Mededingingswet) 
Variable for Antitrust Immunity 
immunityit = 1 if antitrust immunity is provided to some subset of firms in industry 
Proxies for Exposure to Trade 
importit = 1 if import intensity of industry (the shares of total imports in total sales in 
industry) is in the first quartile, 2 if import intensity of industry is in the second quartile, 3 if 
import intensity of industry is in the third quartile, and 4 if import intensity of industry is in 
the fourth quartile. Quartiles are defined using all manufacturing industries in the sample. 
exportit = 1 if export intensity of industry (exports-sales ratio) is in the first quartile, 2 
if export intensity of industry is in the second quartile, 3 if export intensity of industry is in 
the third quartile, and 4 if export intensity of industry is in the fourth quartile. Quartiles are 
defined using all manufacturing industries in the sample. 
Proxies for the Change in Market Demand 
dgdpit = change in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growthit = percentage growth of sales in the relevant market 
Variables for Market Structure 
hhiit = Hirshman-Herfindahl Index 
Interaction Term 14 
 
lawXhhiit = Hirshman-Herfindahl Index interacted with the change in the competition 
law. 
Time Dummies 
TIME = year fixed effects 
 
In the current study, price-cost margins are calculated at industry level as a share of gross 
profits to total sales. Gross profits are obtained by subtracting total wages and the costs of 
intermediate inputs from value added. The lagged price-cost margins are included as a 
regressor to control for the fact that some industries may have been colluding secretly or 
tacitly prior to time t, a fact that might otherwise obfuscate the relationship between the 
introduction of the Competition Act and industry price-cost margins. As one might remember, 
the new Competition Act allowed undertakings to apply for dispensation for agreements that 
were already in existence and that had begun in the era of “cartel paradise”. More specifically, 
firms had been allowed to request exemption from Article 6 Mw that prohibited restrictive 
concerted practices. The variable immunity controls for those industries in which some subset 
of firms received exemption from Article 6 Mw. Furthermore, in order to control for exposure 
to trade we have included import and export intensities. Besides, as crude proxies for increase 
in market demand, change in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (dgdp) and percentage 
growth of sales in the relevant market (growth) are also included. On the other hand, in order 
to control for market structure we include Hirshman-Herfindahl Index (hhi), which is defined 
as the sum of the squares of the market shares based on sales. By construction, the higher 
values of this variable indicate more concentrated market structures. Adopting a static and 
traditional view, one would expect that price-cost margins in concentrated industries will be 
higher, as firms are enjoying higher levels of profits owing to less number of competitors. In 
addition to control variables described above, we include interaction term between change in 
the competition law (law) and concentration measure (hhi), to check if the impact of 
concentration on price-cost margins were aggravated under the new system. The underlying 
thought is that once a stricter antitrust policy was enforced, firms might have preferred 
mergers or takeovers as possible strategies rather than engaging in illegal and dirty 
coordinated actions. Finally, we consider the time-specific effects as fixed and include time 
dummies in the analysis.  
 
Equations [1] and [2] are dynamic panel regressions with a lagged dependent variable on the 
right-hand side. By construction, the unobserved industry effects are correlated with the 15 
 
lagged dependent variable, which makes standard estimators inconsistent. Elsewhere, one 
should also be aware of the reverse causality in the specification above. More specifically, 
growth and hhi might be endogenous with respect to price-cost margins. Thus, we plan to 
address the above-mentioned econometric issues under a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) framework following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano 
and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). We first consider Arellano-Bond 
estimation, also known as “difference GMM”, which uses lagged independent variables as 
instruments after the equation has been differenced to eliminate unobserved fixed effects. 
Secondly, we implement the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation, also known as 
“system GMM”, which is built on a system of two equations (the equation with levels and the 
transformed equation). A common feature of these estimators is that they require no 
autocorrelation in the errors. Having performed the estimations, we will run some 
specification tests to verify the absence of autocorrelation. Besides, in order to ensure more-
efficient estimation we will use optimal or two-step GMM in both estimation procedures. 
However, the problem in this context is that standard errors for the two-step GMM estimator 
might be downward biased as shown by Arellano and Bond (1991). Therefore, we will use a 
bias-corrected robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix for the two-step GMM 
estimator devised by Windmeijer (2005).  
  
In order to take into account the endogeneity of growth and hhi, we have used one lag of these 
variables together with the remaining exogenous regressors as instruments. The employment 
of instruments for two endogenous variables and one lagged dependent variable will 
necessitate numerous instruments, which might result in the famous case of “instrument 
proliferation”, as stated in Roodman (2009). “Instrument proliferation” might lead to 
overfitting endogenous variables. In this case we fail to take out the endogenous components 
and bias coefficient estimates. Another problem associated with instrument proliferation is 
that it might vitiate the Hansen test of instrument validity. However, since there is no formal 
test and procedure for identifying and solving these problems, researchers have come up with 
the rule of thumb proposing that the number of instruments should be less than or equal to the 
number of observational units. Therefore, we try to stick to this rule of thumb in our GMM 
estimations. 
 
Table II provides summary statistics on industry characteristics during both pre- and post-
implementation of the new Competition Act. During the old Economic Competition Act era, 16 
 
price-cost margins appear to be lower, which can also be seen from the evolution of price-cost 
margins depicted in Figure I. We also present an overview of the changes in the price-cost 
margins under the old Economic Competition Act and under the New Competition Act in 
Figure II. Just looking at descriptive measures, one can say that the deterrent impact of the 
new Competition Act has been heterogeneous across Dutch manufacturing industries. Yet, 
without effectively controlling for other relevant factors in an econometric setting, we cannot 
reach sound and scientific conclusions.    
 
5.  The Empirical Results 
Tables III and IV report difference and system GMM estimates of various specifications, 
respectively, for the impact of change in the competition law on the price-cost margins. In all 
specifications, fixed year dummies are included as well. The reported standard errors have the 
finite sample correction developed by Windmeijer (2005) to handle the potential finite sample 
bias of two-step GMM.   
 
We would first like to draw reader’s attention to the satisfactory results of specification tests. 
The tests concerning serial correlation do not reject the presence of first order, but rejects 
second order serial correlation. Besides, we cannot  reject the null hypothesis that the 
population moment conditions are correct, since the Sargan tests do not reject the validity of 
over-identifying restrictions in all specifications. 
 
The results show that  exposure to trade (import  and  export), market structure (hhi), and 
changes in market demand (dgnp and growth) do not have statistically significant effects on 
the price-cost margins of Dutch manufacturing industries in any specification. The outcome of 
the imprecise effect of import intensity on industry price-cost margins is also in line with the 
finding of Konings et al. (2001), where the authors found that import competition does not 
lead to lower price-cost margins in the Netherlands. Elsewhere, concentration (hhi) has a 
positive but statistically insignificant effect on price-cost margins. Furthermore, whether the 
impact of industry concentration has been higher after the change in the competition law has 
not been confirmed in the current setting, since the interaction term (lawXhhi) has a positive 
but statistically insignificant coefficient in the seventh specification.   
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In both difference and system GMM estimates of all specifications, we find that the 
coefficient of the lagged price-cost margins (lag_pcm) is highly statistically significant (at 1 
% level) indicating that we should reject a static model in favor of a dynamic model. Finally, 
the variable in which we show our greatest interest, that is, the introduction of the new 
Competition Act (law) is negatively and insignificantly related to the price-cost margins, 
which seems not to corroborate our first maintained hypothesis: the transition from the old 
system to the new system did not bring about statistically significant deterrent effects. 
 
Subsequently, in Tables V and VI we present difference and system GMM estimates of 
various specifications, respectively, for the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity 
on the industry price-cost margins. Just as in the former specifications, fixed year dummies 
are included to control for year fixed effects. Similarly, we present the standard errors with 
Windmeijer (2005) correction.  
 
The failure to reject the null hypotheses of both the serial correlation and the Sargan tests 
provide support for our model. Likewise, the fact that the coefficient of the lagged price-cost 
margins (lag_pcm) is highly statistically significant (at 1 % level) in both difference and 
system GMM estimates of all specifications, leads us to be confident about our dynamic 
specification. 
 
The results demonstrate that exposure to trade (import and export), market structure (hhi), and 
changes in market demand (dgnp and growth) do not have statistically significant effects on 
the price-cost margins of Dutch manufacturing industries under the new Competition act in 
any specification. Importantly, the coefficient on temporary antitrust immunity (immunity) 
enters positively and statistically significantly to the regression equation in all specifications. 
This result verifies our second maintained hypothesis stating that in industries where 
concerted practices are immune from antitrust law, the price-cost margins will be higher 
everything else being equal. However, one should bear in mind that concerted practices that 
were conferred immunity from antitrust law constituted a tiny fraction of all concerted 
practices for which exemption was sought. Thus, the industries where antitrust immunity was 
granted for some class of concerted practices form a very tiny share of our whole sample. 
Moreover, these concerted practices for which immunity was granted were not necessarily 
“dirty” agreements the Dutch Competition Authority overlooked. Besides, the selection of 
industries in which a subset of agreements would be immune from antitrust law might be 18 
 
endogenous with respect to price-cost margins. That is, the NMa might have allowed 
concerted practices in industries where price-cost margins were already expected to be high.  
 
Taking these caveats into account, we provide a discussion of the empirical findings in the 
next section. 
 
6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
One aspect of estimating the economic impact of competition policy enforcement regards the 
change in producer surplus. Controlling for other relevant factors, increased competitive 
pressures via enforcing stricter policies are expected to curb monopoly power and joint 
dominance of collusive practices. An indirect way of measuring this is to investigate the 
impact of the change in the competition law that serves as an invaluable natural experiment on 
price-cost margins. The institutional change in the Netherlands provides a unique example of 
such natural experiment. The transition from the old Economic Competition Act, which was 
based on the so-called “abuse system”, to the new Competition Act, which was based on 
“prohibition system” accompanied by the establishment of the new enforcement agency, the 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa), was clearly aimed at fostering competition and 
putting an end to “cartel paradise” era. Following this line of reasoning, we investigated the 
impact of the change in the competition policy enforcement in the Netherlands on the level of 
industry price-cost margins for manufacturing industries during the period 1993-2007. We 
tested our first hypothesis stating that a tougher competition policy reduces the ability of firms 
in  any market to collude and, consequently, the price-cost margins will be lower, whilst 
controlling for other factors that are believed to affect the price-cost margins. 
 
Furthermore, the possibility of granting temporary antitrust immunity for some class of 
concerted practices that were shown to have improved production/distribution or stimulated 
economic or technical progress, and, of which reasonable portion of the benefits accrued to 
consumers, enables us to assess a rarely touched research question. Our second maintained 
hypothesis was that in industries where concerted practices are immune from antitrust law, the 
price-cost margins will be higher everything else being equal. More specifically, we analyzed 
the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity on industry price-cost margins in the 
aftermath of the institutional change mentioned above.  
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In order to test these two hypotheses, we employed a two-step dynamic panel data estimation 
technique following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The first part of estimation results suggest that the 
change in the competition law in the Netherlands had a very small and negative, yet 
statistically insignificant deterrent effect on the price-cost margins.  Might this finding be 
attributed to the proposition that the old Economic Competition Act that was based on "abuse 
system"  had already disciplined Dutch manufacturing industries?  Without a moment of 
hesitation, one can easily dismiss alternative explanations for this known-answer question. 
Might the introduction of new Competition Act have dissolved cost-reducing cartels? Since 
we cannot observe the whole population of Dutch cartels, we cannot convincingly defend this 
argument. Or were the sanctions not deterrent enough? Given the convergence between Dutch 
and European competition law, and strict attitude of European competition policy towards 
anti-competitive practices, this proposition is not persuasive, either. Finally, one should 
consider that the level of the analysis is highly aggregate. The deterrent impact, if any, of the 
new Competition Act might be different across Dutch manufacturing industries. It might have 
abolished a great majority of anti-competitive concerted practices in some industries, while it 
did not lead to any structural change in some others. This explanation is partially consistent 
with the finding of Creusen et al. (2006) revealing that the level of competition diverged 
widely in many Dutch industries during the period 1993-2001.  In order to tackle  this 
heterogeneity issue, we plan to conduct research on firm-level data in specific industries in 
our future research. 
 
As to the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity in the aftermath of the institutional 
change, we found that markups were higher in industries in which temporary antitrust 
immunity was granted for some class of coordinated actions. However, one should bear in 
mind that concerted practices that were conferred immunity from antitrust law constituted a 
tiny fraction of all concerted practices for which exemption was sought. Furthermore, these 
concerted practices for which immunity was granted were not necessarily "dirty" agreements 
the NMa overlooked. Plus, the selection of industries in which a subset of agreements would 
be immune from antitrust law might be endogenous with respect to price-cost margins. That 
is, the NMa might have allowed concerted practices in industries where price-cost margins 
were already expected to be high.  
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Obviously, the change in the competition law has impact not only on the price-cost margins 
but also on other components of economic structure. For instance, it might lead to a change in 
firms’ incentives to innovate more, since a more competitive economic environment puts 
higher pressure on firms to survive and make profits. Thus, the question is whether the change 
in the competition law had impact on various innovation indicators in Dutch industries. In our 
further research, we plan to address this research question as well.  
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Tables  
Table I: The Distribution of Provisions in the Horizontal Agreements of which Details 
were published by the MEA in 1989 
 
The Provision(s) in the Horizontal Agreement  Percentages 
Joint tendering with no other provisions  24% 
Joint tendering + Conditions criteria  4% 
Joint tendering + Exclusivity clauses  7% 
Price fixing with no other provisions  4% 
Price fixing + Market sharing  17% 
Price fixing + Production, sales or marketing quotas  14% 
Price fixing + Conditions criteria  12% 
Price fixing + Exclusivity clauses  8% 
Price fixing + Centralized purchasing and sales agencies  8% 
  
 
Table II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Before 1999  After 1999  All 
Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
pcm  570  -0.0005  0.1287  884  0.0330  0.0927  1454  0.0199  0.1094 
growth  552  0.1350  0.7703  854  0.0668  0.4002  1406  0.0936  0.5754 
hhi  570  0.1574  0.1814  884  0.1709  0.1724  1454  0.1656  0.1760 
import  477  3.1132     0.8450  723  3.2434  0.7834  1200  3.1917  0.8106 
export  555  2.6937  1.0372  859  2.7497  1.0617  1414  2.7277  1.0521 
immunity  624  0.0000  0.0000  991  0.0101  0.1000  1615  0.0062  0.0785 
dgdp  614  3.0511  1.1445  940  2.2872  1.4772  1554  2.5891  1.4057 
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Table III: Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimations (Difference GMM) for Price-Cost Margins during 1993-2007 
Dep. Var.: pcm  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
lag_pcm  0.4983  ***  0.4672  ***  0.4642  ***  0.4218  ***  0.4410  ***  0.3641  ***  0.3650  *** 
  (0.0930)    (0.0882)    (0.0945)    (0.0864)    (0.0942)    (0.0988)    (0.1003)    
Variable for the Impact of the Competition Act (Mededingingswet) 
law  -0.0046    -0.0028    -0.0039    -0.0022    -0.0080    -0.0085    -0.0112    
  (0.0077)    (0.0083)    (0.0087)    (0.0075)    (0.0079)    (0.0083)    (0.0147)    
Proxies for the Change in Market Demand 
dgnp  -0.0017    -0.0021    -0.0023    -0.0025    -0.0026    -0.0029    -0.0029    
  (0.0021)    (0.0020)    (0.0024)    (0.0022)    (0.0023)    (0.0024)    (0.0021)    
growth          -0.0025    0.0020    0.0191    0.0216    0.0133    
          (0.0097)    (0.0112)    (0.0245)    (0.0286)    (0.0249)    
Market Structure Variable 
hhi      0.0710        0.0941        0.0809    0.0359    
      (0.0878)        (0.1031)        (0.0634)    (0.0606)    
Proxies for Exposure to Trade 
import                  0.0021    0.0075    0.0081    
                  (0.0095)    (0.0096)    (0.0098)    
export                  -0.0133  **  -0.0119    -0.0113    
                  (0.0063)    (0.0074)    (0.0074)    
Interaction Term  
lawXhhi                          0.0194    
                          (0.0799)    
constant  0.0165    0.0048    0.0172    0.0053    0.0498    0.0213    0.0227    
  (0.0112)    (0.0172)    (0.0126)    (0.0189)    (0.0377)    (0.0388)    (0.0416)    
TIME  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Nr. Of Industries  100  100  96  96  81  81  81 
Observations  1200  1200  1169  1169  1013  1013  1013 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)  z = -4.195, p = 0.000  z = -4.264, p = 0.000  z = -4.110, p = 0.000  z = -4.141, p = 0.000  z = -3.957, p = 0.000  z = -3.710, p = 0.000  z = -3.702, p = 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  z = -0.456, p = 0.649  z = -0.581, p = 0.561  z = -0.527, p = 0.599  z = -0.726, p = 0.468  z = 0.027, p = 0.978  z = -0.284, p = 0.777  z = -0.278, p = 0.781 
Sargan Test (p-value)  0.3056  0.2582  0.2571  0.5610  0.4173  0.8229  0.8485 
Nr. Of Instruments  90  94  94  100  77  91  92 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
•  Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
•  *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level.25 
 
Table IV: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimations (System GMM) for Price-Cost Margins during 1993-2007 
Dep. Var.: pcm  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Lagged Dependent Variable                             
lag_pcm  0.4830  ***  0.4359  ***  0.4343  ***  0.4346  ***  0.4038  ***  0.3794  ***  0.3986  *** 
  (0.0752)    (0.0750)    (0.0674)    (0.0713)    (0.0777)    (0.0738)    (0.0594)   
Variable for the Impact of the Competition Act (Mededingingswet) 
law  -0.0022    -0.0010    -0.0072    -0.0030    -0.0055    -0.0072    -0.0136   
  (0.0085)    (0.0072)    (0.0082)    (0.0086)    (0.0094)    (0.0095)    (0.0097)   
Proxies for the Change in Market Demand 
dgnp  -0.0012    -0.0023    -0.0036  *  -0.0033    -0.0021    -0.0026    -0.0019   
  (0.0023)    (0.0021)    (0.0021)    (0.0024)    (0.0025)    (0.0024)    (0.0023)   
growth          0.0048    0.0059    0.0205    0.0194    0.0132   
          (0.0108)    (0.0095)    (0.0301)    (0.0278)    (0.0213)   
Market Structure Variable 
hhi      -0.0263        0.0142        0.0636    0.0528   
      (0.0563)        (0.0632)        (0.0717)    (0.0540)   
Proxies for Exposure to Trade 
import                  0.0080    0.0068    0.0102   
                  (0.0084)    (0.0087)    (0.0080)   
export                  -0.0056    -0.0050    -0.0062   
                  (0.0055)    (0.0046)    (0.0042)   
Interaction Term 
lawXhhi                          0.0316   
                          (0.0623)   
constant  0.0136    0.0205    0.0240    0.0173    0.0070    0.0046    -0.0034   
  (0.0118)    (0.0118)    (0.0105)    (0.0135)    (0.0368)    (0.0345)    (0.0282)   
TIME  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Nr. Of Industries  100  100  99  99  81  81  81 
Observations  1318  1318  1283  1283  1102  1102  1102 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)  z = -4.449, p = 0.000  z = -4.416, p = 0.000  z = -4.484, p = 0.000  z = -4.403, p = 0.000  z = -4.158, p = 0.000  z = -4.122, p = 0.000  z = -4.392, p = 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  z = -0.477, p = 0.633  z = -0.595, p = 0.552  z = -0.666, p = 0.505  z = -0.677, p = 0.499  z = -0.097, p = 0.923  z = -0.213, p = 0.832  z = -0.204, p = 0.839 
Sargan Test (p-value)  0.3107  0.4469  0.3077  0.3748  0.5318  0.9415  0.9885 
Nr. Of Instruments  90  90  90  104  80  106  107 
Wald Test of Joint Significance  
(p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
•  Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
•  *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level.26 
 
Table V: Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimations (Difference GMM) for Price-Cost Margins after the Change in the 
Competition Law 
 
Dep. Var.: pcm  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
lag_pcm  0.4509  ***  0.4347  ***  0.4146  ***  0.3727  ***  0.4267  ***  0.4319  ***  0.4472  *** 
  (0.0931)    (0.0944)    (0.0927)    (0.0948)    (0.1024)    (0.0883)    (0.0901)   
Variable for Antitrust Immunity 
immunity  0.0380  ***  0.0351  ***  0.0339  ***  0.0351  ***  0.0353  ***  0.0247  ***  0.0319  *** 
  (0.0146)    (0.0126)    (0.0097)    (0.0096)    (0.0113)    (0.0104)    (0.0125)   
Proxies for the Change in Market Demand 
dgnp  -0.0019    -0.0022    -0.0025    -0.0031    -0.0023    -0.0021    -0.0023   
  (0.0020)    (0.0021)    (0.0022)    (0.0021)    (0.0024)    (0.0023)    (0.0024)   
growth          0.0079    0.0106    0.0288    0.0388    0.0365   
          (0.0082)    (0.0113)    (0.0296)    (0.0424)    (0.0447)   
Market Structure Variable 
hhi      -0.0475        -0.0539        -0.0220    -0.0736   
      (0.0965)        (0.0826)        (0.1467)    (0.1007)   
Proxies for Exposure to Trade 
import                  0.0077    0.0045    0.0006   
                  (0.0097)    (0.0078)    (0.0088)   
export                  -0.0089    -0.0115    -0.0102   
                  (0.0068)    (0.0073)    (0.0080)   
constant  0.0137    0.0222    0.0161  *  0.0260    0.0114    0.0296    0.0444   
  (0.0085)    (0.0180)    (0.0097)    (0.0163)    (0.0395)    (0.0327)    (0.0419)   
TIME  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Nr. Of Industries  100  100  96  96  81  81  81 
Observations  848  848  825  825  710  710  710 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)  z = -3.517, p = 0.000  z = -3.510, p = 0.000  z = -3.452, p = 0.000  z = -3.371, p = 0.000  z = -3.229, p = 0.000  z = -3.329, p = 0.000  z = -3.370, p = 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  z = -0.032, p = 0.975  z = -0.020, p = 0.984  z = -0.210, p = 0.834  z = -0.304, p = 0.761  z = -0.234, p = 0.815  z = -0.198, p = 0.843  z = -0.089, p = 0.929 
Sargan Test (p-value)  0.2288  0.3522  0.3803  0.5325  0.4172  0.7288  0.6061 
Nr. Of Instruments  92  95  95  100  76  85  86 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
•  Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
•  *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level.27 
 
Table VI: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimations (System GMM) for Price-Cost Margins after the Change in 
the Competition Law 
 
Dep. Var.: pcm  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
lag_pcm  0.5025  ***  0.4963  ***  0.4810  ***  0.4893  ***  0.4367  ***  0.4085  ***  0.4227  *** 
  (0.0827)    (0.0854)    (0.0930)    (0.0805)    (0.0967)    (0.0867)    (0.0848)    
Variable for Antitrust Immunity 
immunity  0.0325  ***  0.0370  **  0.0380  ***  0.0335  **  0.0276  **  0.0320  **  0.0359  ** 
  (0.0103)    (0.0158)    (0.0097)    (0.0151)    (0.0131)    (0.0149)    (0.0146)    
Proxies for the Change in Market Demand 
dgnp  -0.0016    -0.0024    -0.0025    -0.0026    -0.0031    -0.0031    -0.0030    
  (0.0022)    (0.0021)    (0.0024)    (0.0023)    (0.0032)    (0.0027)    (0.0029)    
growth          0.0025    0.0093    0.0556    0.0462    0.0335    
          (0.0112)    (0.0093)    (0.0407)    (0.0369)    (0.0391)    
Market Structure Variable 
hhi      -0.0781        -0.0465        0.0632    -0.0133    
      (0.1018)        (0.0915)        (0.0636)    (0.0713)    
Proxies for Exposure to Trade 
import                  0.0042    0.0082    0.0099    
                  (0.0085)    (0.0076)    (0.0079)    
export                  -0.0046    -0.0055    -0.0048    
                  (0.0059)    (0.0065)    (0.0070)    
constant  0.0115    0.0251    0.0153    0.0208    0.0126    -0.0042    -0.0052    
  (0.0089)    (0.0194)    (0.0099)    (0.0173)    (0.0330)    (0.0324)    (0.0279)    
TIME  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Nr. Of Industries  100  100  98  98  81  81  81 
Observations  863  863  840  840  715  715  715 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)  z = -3.719, p = 0.000  z = -3.722, p = 0.000  z = -3.563, p = 0.000  z = -3.720, p = 0.000  z = -3.342, p = 0.000  z = -3.349, p = 0.000  z = -3.376, p = 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  z = -0.086, p = 0.931  z = 0.148, p = 0.883  z = -0.002, p = 0.998  z = 0.002, p = 0.999  z = -0.199, p = 0.842  z = -0.350, p = 0.727  z = -0.245, p = 0.807 
Sargan Test (p-value)  0.3556  0.4367  0.2462  0.4254  0.2441  0.8018  0.7036 
Nr. Of Instruments  101  100  92  101  76  94  95 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
•  Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
•  *: Significant at 10 % level, **: significant at 5 % level, ***: significant at 1 % level.28 
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Figure II: The Overview of Changes in the Price-Cost Margins in Dutch Manufacturing Industries under the Old Economic Competition 
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